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Abstract—Cameras are expected to become key sensor de-
vices for various internet of things (IoT) applications. Since
cameras often capture highly sensitive information, security
is a major concern. Our approach towards data security for
smart cameras is rooted on protecting the captured images
by signcryption based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).
Signcryption achieves resource-efficiency by performing data
signing and encryption in a single step. By running the
signcryption on the sensing unit, we can relax some security
assumptions for the camera host unit which typically runs a
complex software stack. We introduce our system architecture
motivated by a typical case study for camera-based IoT appli-
cations, evaluate security properties and present performance
results of an ARM-based implementation.
Keywords-Smart camera; Signcryption; Security; Internet of
Things;
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cameras are real-time video acquisition and pro-
cessing systems that combine onboard sensing, processing
and communication capabilities and play an important role
in several IoT applications [1]. However, security and pri-
vacy protection has become a major concern due to their
widespread deployment, the sensitive nature of the captured
data and the open infrastructure [2], [3]. Basic security
objectives for a smart camera are thus (i) to prove the
originality of images or video data (integrity), (ii) its origin
(authenticity of visual sensor) and (iii) to avoid third parties
unauthorized access (confidentiality) throughout the entire
lifetime of the data.
This paper introduces a security approach for smart
cameras by integrating signcryption [4] with elliptic curve
(EC) for improving resource efficiency. We have extended
the preliminary work on securing the camera node [5] by
separating the platform into a trusted sensing unit with
exclusive access to the image data and an untrusted cam-
era host unit running user specific applications, operating
system, middleware and networking tasks. Such separation
helps to mitigate the increasing attack threats for complex
embedded software systems [6]. Integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality are typically achieved by digital signature
and (public key) encryption. Traditionally, these security
functions are realized as sequential steps in a sign-then-
encrypt fashion (e.g. [7]). Signcryption is a resource-efficient
technique which implements signature and encryption in a
single step and achieves a lower computational and commu-
nication cost than the traditional approach [4], [8]. In our
approach we apply EC-based signcryption directly on the
sensing unit in order to push protection as close as possible
to the sensor. The particular challenges for our approach are
the resource limitations, the processing of high volume of
image or video data, the open infrastructure (e.g., Internet)
and the need for real-time performance in IoT.
The contribution of this work lies in the deployment and
evaluation of EC-based signcryption directly on the sensing
unit. We propose the overall system architecture which is
motivated by a smart home surveillance case study and
briefly analyze security properties of our approach. The
case study is defined as event-triggered monitoring where
smart cameras perform onboard event detection and initiate
the transfer of protected data to mobile devices and some
backup server. We further present runtime measurements on
an ARM-based implementation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses the state-of-the-art. Section III introduces the
system architecture and threat model. Section IV and V de-
scribe the proposed solution, experimental setup and results,
respectively. Finally, section VI concludes the paper.
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART
In the following, we briefly discuss selected security
techniques for image data. Digital watermarking [9], [10] is
a widely used approach for the integrity verification of image
data, i.e., to detect any changes in the size or pixel values of
images. Schneider and Chang [11] presented a content-based
digital signature method to authenticate images and videos.
They first extracted the interesting contents from the image,
hashed it and then used the private key for generating the
signature. Atrey et al. [12] also applied a digital signature
scheme to detect spatial cropping and temporal jittering
in a video stream. They used three hierarchical levels of
videos and converted the input video into shots which
were then converted to frames. For each level a signature
is generated; a master signature is then derived from the
individual level signatures using a master key. Mohanty [13]
presented a scheme called cryptmark which is based on dig-
ital watermarking and advanced encryption standard (AES)
encryption techniques for the security of smart cameras as
part of an integrated real-time digital rights management
(RDM) system. He used a custom designed embedded smart
camera prototype based on a field programmable gate array
(FPGA) and achieved integrity, authenticity and guaranteed
ownership rights for videos.
Another research area is to apply security techniques close
to the visual sensor. Nelson et al. [14] proposed a CMOS
active pixel sensor (APS) imager with sensor-specific on-
chip watermarking. This built-in watermarking was intended
towards a pervasive image authentication. Stifter et al. [15]
used an on-chip cryptographic unit to secure the image and
video data. They achieved the authentication, integrity and
freshness of a complete image frame by calculating a check-
sum derived from message authentication code (MAC). They
also equipped the image sensor with a dedicated EEPROM
to uniquely identify the imager. Serpanos and Papalambrou
[16] suggested that, the image sensor should be trusted to
prevent the insertion of unauthorized nodes in a distributed
smart camera system. Winkler and Rinner [17] presented
a novel platform TrustEYE.M4 using a hardware based
trusted platform module (TPM) security chip for onboard
security and privacy protection. In [7] they extended their
work based on a sign-then-encrypt approach and presented
a solution for the secure use of public cloud storage for data
archiving and delivering. By using RSA digital signature
and time-stamping techniques, they were able to prove non-
repudiation and authentication for the captured data. Cao et
al. [18] proposed a CMOS image sensor based on physical
unclonable function (PUF) for on-chip authentication and
identification. They generated a unique and reliable signature
by exploiting the dark signal noise uniformity of fixed
pattern noise in the CMOS image sensor.
Our proposed signcryption technique implements elliptic
curve based digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) and AES
in a single step, which provides integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality simultaneously for image or video data. The
smaller key size of EC [19] and the implementation of
signature and encryption in a single step [20] supports real-
time data security directly on the sensing unit. To the best
of our knowledge, our approach is the first deployment of
signcryption in this context.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The external and internal view of the proposed system
architecture is shown in Figure 1.
A. External view
The external view shows the integral components of
typical IoT applications. In particular, we envision event-
triggered monitoring in a smart home as use case. The
primary goals of this use case are: (i) monitoring of spe-
cific regions of interests with smart cameras, (ii) onboard
detection of predefined events, (iii) transmission of real-
time event messages and images to mobile devices, and
(iv) storing the collected information on the server. The
server also notifies the mobile device when a new image
or video data is added to it. The stored information on the
server can be easily accessed by the mobile device. Figure 1
highlights the communication between these IoT devices in
different colors, e.g., green represents the exchange of alerts
or request messages and brown represents the exchange of
video frames or images.
B. Internal view
The internal view shows the functionalities of the system,
where the sensing unit captures the image sequence of target
scene and detects regions of interest (RoI) through pre-
defined low-level video processing algorithms. The RoIs
serve as event data and are transfered to the camera host
which is responsible for further processing and for trans-
mitting them to the backup server and alerting the mobile
device about the detected events.
C. Threat model
In this work, a threat model addresses eavesdropping,
data modification, impersonation and replay attacks to the
information transmitted from the sensing unit to the mobile
device.
1) Assumptions: We assume that the sensing unit is
trusted and hence that the attacker has no access to data on
the unit. The protection of the sensing unit is build upon our
previous work [7] and [21]. The attacker can access the data
possibly on the camera host part, communication channels
or backup server, as reported in the context of IoT smart
home [22] and visual sensor network (VSN) [2] scenarios.
The denial of service (DoS) attacks on the camera host or
backup server are not explicitly considered in this work.
Moreover, we assume that the mobile device is trustworthy
and the private keys are securely stored on it. The corruption
of software or hardware and DoS attacks on the camera
host, backup server or mobile device can disrupt the normal
functionality of the proposed system architecture.
2) Eavesdropping attack: Eavesdropping is a passive
attack and its goal is to compromise the confidentiality
of information during transmission on the communication
channel or in any other part of the system e.g., on the
camera host or the backup server. Eavesdropping attacks are
possible if security credentials such as encryption keys are
compromised by the attacker.
3) Data modification: In the case of the data modification
attack, the attacker can change, inject or delete information
stored on the camera host as well as during the transmis-
sion to the mobile device. Compromised keys are common
reasons for this attack.
Figure 1. System architecture: (a) The external view consists of a set of distributed smart cameras, a backup server and set of mobile devices communicating
with each other. (b) The internal view shows the functionalities and flow of data in the system, where the smart camera is further divided into a sensing
unit and a camera host unit. The camera host consists of different hardware and software stacks e.g., operating system, network stack, system libraries, to
run and manage the camera application.
4) Impersonation: During an impersonation attack, an
attacker successfully uses the identity of a legitimate com-
ponent to transmit its own data.
5) Replay attack: In a replay attack the same valid
information are transmitted by an attacker repeatedly or he
modifies timestamps and delivers outdated information as
fresh one.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the system architecture shown in Figure 1, the sensing
unit extracts the ROIs and generates alert messages from
the captured video. This work proposes the signcryption
technique to implement signature and encryption in a single
logical step directly on the sensing unit to protect the
event data (ROIs and alert messages). The sensing unit then
transmits the protected event data to the camera host which
verifies the received data and forwards the signcrypted alert
message and related video frames to the mobile device and
the backup server, respectively. When the server receives
new data from the smart camera, it sends a push notification
to the mobile device. As soon as the mobile device receives
the alert message from the smart camera and a push notifica-
tion from the server, it sends a request to the server to access
the required data. Due to the limited storage on the smart
camera data is only stored on the backup server. Thus, the
data will only be available for further access on the backup
server. This approach minimizes the incoming requests on
smart camera and allows specific (known requests) only,
which on the other hand minimizes the DoS attacks. But
the explicit protection of DoS attacks are beyond the scope
of this paper.
A. Signcryption
The signcryption technique simultaneously fulfills both
the functions of digital signature and public key encryp-
tion logically in a single step and provides authentication,
integrity, and confidentiality.
1) Signcryption setup: In this work we implement sign-
cryption [20] with ECDSA and public key encryption AES.
An one-way keyed hash function and 256 bits AES key are
required for signcryption. The setup of the implementation
is based on the EC domain parameters [23]. An EC over
the finite field Fp is represented by E(Fp) with a base point
G ∈ Fp of order q, where G is chosen randomly from set
of points on E(Fp). The parameter p is a prime number
specifying the finite field Fp.
2) Keys generation for signcryption: Assume that the
private key generator (PKG) generates the private key Pr
and the public key Pu using EC for the sensing unit and
other devices in our system architecture. The private key
is randomly chosen from a set of large prime numbers.
The public keys are derived also from the point on the
elliptic curve on the basis of the chosen private key, e.g.,
Pu = Pr.G, is called elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). PKG generates the sensor’s private key
Prsensor and the public key Pusensor. It also generates
the mobile device private key Prmobile and the public key
Pumobile. These keys are distributed by a key distribution
center (KDC) in a secure way during initialization of the
system or joining of new device.
3) Signcryption algorithm: After distribution of the keys
by the KDC, each device securely stores its private key
and shares its public key with each other. The sensing unit
applies signcryption on the captured video or image frames.
Figure 2. Signcryption model.
The signcryption algorithm chooses a prime number v where
v ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...q − 1}. The signcrypted message and frames
represented by green and brown color in the form of (c,R, s)
are transferred to the camera host as shown in the Figure 2.
k1 = hash(v.G) (1)
k2 = hash(v.Pumobile) (2)
c = Enck2(frame) (3)





R = (r.G) (6)
Signcryption output = (c,R, s) (7)
Then the camera host verifies the authenticity of the sign-
crypted data with the public key of the sensor and considers
it as authentic if r.G = R, otherwise the host discards it.
By using this property of signcryption, the camera host can
verify the authenticity of the data without compromising its
confidentiality. After the succesful verification the camera
host forwards the secured alert message and frames to the
mobile device and the backup server, respectively.
4) Un-signcryption algorithm: When the mobile device
receives an alert message and encrypted video frames, it
performs the following un-signcryption algorithm as shown
in Figure 3.
k1 = hash(s(R+ Pusensor)) (8)
r = hash(c, k1) (9)
k2 = hash(Prmobile(s(R+ Pusensor))) (10)
frame = Deck2(c) (11)
r.G = R (12)
Figure 3. Un-signcryption model.
B. Security analysis
A security analysis of the signcryption scheme (section
IV) with specific attention to the system architecture (section
III) is presented, in order to countermeasure the attacks
identified in our threat model (section III-C). The basic
security goals of these countermeasures are confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, freshness of the data processed by the
sensing unit. The security of signcryption is based on the
assumption of computational hardness of ECDLP [24].
1) Confidentiality: Confidentiality of image or video
frames is provided by AES encryption using a session key
k2 during the signcryption process. k2 is derived by using
a secret key v and the public key of the mobile device
Pumobile (cp. Equ. (2)). In this case, the attacker needs to
know v to derive k2. To guess v corresponds to solving the
ECDLP. Another possibility for an attacker is to solve Equ.
(10), but in this case the attacker only knows the public key
of the mobile device Pumobile but not the private key of
mobile device Prmobile. To derive the private key of the
mobile device attacker needs to solve the ECDLP again. It
means that the encryption key is secure from both sensing
unit and mobile device perspective to the attacker.
2) Integrity: The sensing unit processes a valid signcryp-
tion part r by hashing the encrypted data c with k1 as shown
in Equ. (4). In this case anyone can check the integrity of
the encrypted data using k1 derived from the associated
public key of sensor, s and R as shown in Equ. (8). If
an attacker modifies the encrypted data c to c′, the change
will be detected on the mobile device because of collision
resistance of the hash function. This technique will provide
the integrity of the single image or of video frame data as
well as the correct ordering of all the frames.
3) Authentication: In the proposed system model, it is
important to know the identity of the sensor of the smart
camera which is claiming the capturing of the image or video
data. The signcryption technique provides the authentication
by using the following proofs e.g.,
if hash(s(R+Pusensor)) = hash(v.G) = (k1) from Equs.
(1) and (8).
4) Freshness of the captured data: Timestamping pro-
vides freshness of data and prevents replay attacks. We
assume that image or video frames are securely timestamped
before signcryption. The mobile device verifies the validity
and timestamp by un-signcryption of the image.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
The implementation of the proposed EC-based signcryp-
tion is performed on a Raspberry Pi-3 which has an 1.2
GHz ARMv8 CPU and 1 GB RAM. A Pi-camera sensor
is used to capture images in JPEG format. The images are
stored in Base-64 encoding to enable AES encryption during
the signcryption process. Java is used for implementation
because of its portability, its built-in security features, and
the open source Java libraries for EC computation. To eval-
uate the efficiency of signcryption technique, we integrated
signcryption and unsigncryption in a single Java package
and measured the running times. We investigated the run-
ning times for protecting single images in two different
experiments. In the first experiment (as shown in Fig. 4),
we varied the key size for EC (192, 256 and 384 bits)
and kept the image size fixed to 105 kB. In the second
experiment (as shown in Fig. 5), we varied the image size
(68, 105 and 180 kB) and kept the key size fixed to 384
bits. The results show that the running time is only slightly
influenced by these variations. Although the image size
is almost tripled, the running time only varies by 5 %
for signcryption and 11 % for unsigncryption, respectively.
The computationally expensive part of signcryption and
unsigncryption are EC-point operations. Signcryption has
a slightely longer running time because it requires three
EC-point multiplications, whereas unsigncryption has two
EC-point multiplications and one EC-point addition. The
running time is not affected by changing the AES encryption
key, because the signcryption algorithm applies a SHA 256-
bit hash function to the key before using it (see Equs. (2)
and (3)). Thus, although keys with variable bit lengths are
provided, encryption is always performed with the 256-bit
key K2. We intend to compares these results with state-of-
the-art approaches in our future work.
A. Discussion
Due to the smaller key size and the single-step implemen-
tation of signature and encryption, EC-based signcryption
has potential advantages over existing works such as the
sequential implementation of watermarking [13] or RSA-
based digital signature [7] with AES encryption. It was
demonstrated [24] that a comparable security level can be
obtained by EC using a smaller key length with respect to
RSA (e.g., 160-bits key with EC cryptography is equivalent
to 1024-bits key with RSA). Hence, the implementation of
EC-based signcryption on the image or video frames requires
less computational costs. The multiplication and addition
Figure 4. Running time of signcryption and unsigncryption with different
EC keys for an 480× 320 image with a size of 105 kB.
Figure 5. Running time of signcryption and unsigncryption with different
image sizes using an EC P-384 key
operations of EC-points are the most time consuming parts
of signcryption and unsigncryption processes. However, it is
worth noticing that these parts need to be executed only once
at the beginning of the signcryption process and after that,
only encryption or decryption part influences the running
time. A hardware accelerators for hash function, AES and
EC on the smart camera can improve the computational
efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, EC-based signcryption has been used to
protect data captured by smart cameras for event-triggered
monitoring in IoT applications. We first identified the po-
tential threats for such applications and then analyzed se-
lected security issues. The proposed signcryption, which is
implemented on the sensing unit, provides countermeasures
to the possible threats and enables the authenticity of en-
crypted images on the untrusted camera host part without
compromising its confidentiality. We analyzed the running
time of proposed signcryption techniques on Raspberry Pi-
3. The results show that EC-based signcryption is resource
efficient for the security of image or video frames directly
on the sensing unit.
Our future plans include the exploitation of physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) to generate secure and tamper-
proof private keys for resource constrained sensing units.
We plan to use ECDLP for generating the associated public
keys from that PUF-based private keys. Another direction
is to extend this work for the security and safety of public
premises. In our current work we initiated the data trans-
fer when simple pre-defined events have been detected.
Detection of more complex or “unusual” events requires
substantial computation which might be challenging for
resource-constrained sensing units. Another challenge for
such scenarios is to maintain the privacy of the observed
people.
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